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The consequences of delegation to independent agencies: 
Separation of powers, discursive governance and the regulation of 
telecommunications in Germany 
THOMAS GEHRING 
Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, University of Bamberg, Germany 
Abstract. Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the prin-
cipal's perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory 
output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led 
to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an 
(almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized 
functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of 
independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social 
systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an 
increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision-making. Second, drawing 
on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differen-
tiation supports the transformation of interaction from interest-based bargaining to deli-
berative arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are 
made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence. 
Independent regulatory agencies are a modern form of market regulation. 
While they were invented in the United States in the nineteenth century to 
protect administrative decision-making from partisan politics (Shapiro 1988), 
they have now spread all over the Western world with the task of regulating 
the public utilities (Majone 1996; Thatcher & Stone Sweet 2002). They also 
appear in the form of independent central banks or cartel offices. Even new 
political systems such as the European Union (Egan 1998) and polities with 
little experience in delegating functions to 'arm's length' institutions like 
Germany are increasingly coming to establish largely independent regulatory 
agencies (Döhler 2002). 
For a traditional 'Principal-Agent' approach, it is difficult to explain why 
legislatures establish regulatory agencies and central banks that are more or 
less independent from their principals because the approach focuses primarily 
on oversight. Delegation always establishes new actors that may develop and 
pursue their own interests, rather than those of their principals (Moe 1990: 
121). Inevitably, it generates 'agency losses' and requires that efforts be made 
to ensure that an entrusted agent does that for which it was established. 
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Whereas earlier theories of bureaucracy claimed that administrations were 
hard to control (Niskanen 1971), studies using the Principal-Agent framework 
attempted to assess the actual margin of discrete choice enjoyed by an agency. 
Inspection of the political system in the United States revealed that Congress 
may, for example, closely supervise the activities of its agents (McCubbins 
& Schwartz 1987; Hopenhayn & Lohmann 1996), prescribe administrative 
procedures (McCubbins et al. 1987; Epstein & O'Halloran 1994), control an 
agency's budget and appoint its executives (Huber 2000), or adopt detailed 
legislation to limit discretion (Huber et al. 2001). Successful oversight does 
not necessarily require explicit action because an agent may anticipate sanc-
tions and adapt to the principal's expectations (Pollack 2002: 202). 
If relative independence is granted to a public body in order to keep 
regulatory decision-making at arms' length from the grip of the legislator, an 
agency can no longer be an agent in the understanding of Principal-Agent 
theory. Rather, it becomes a fiduciary entrusted with discretion to pursue a 
principal's interest without immediate oversight by the latter (Majone 2001; 
Stone Sweet 2002). To be sure, a principal will generally expect to benefit from 
division of labour and specialization (Coleman 1990:146; Kiewiet & McCub-
bins 1991: 22-24). A legislative majority may want to tie subsequent govern-
ments to their regulatory decisions (see Shepsle 1992 on coalitional drift). 
Likewise, a legislator may assume that private investors do not become active 
in a sector of the public utilities unless they expect long-term stability of 
regulation (Majone 1996: 5-6). In all these cases, oversight by the principal is 
no longer the predominant issue. 
The consequences of assigning competencies to an independent regulatory 
agency remain to be examined. Once the agency has been established, it begins 
to bind, and thus 'control', the original principal. However, the diminishing 
relevance of immediate oversight by the principal must not be interpreted 
as absence of the problem of agency shirking (Shepsle 1992) or as unlimited 
freedom to act arbitrarily. More sophisticated oversight arrangements are 
required to make the agency accountable for its decisions without undermin-
ing its independent decision-making function (Majone 1999;Thatcher & Stone 
Sweet 2002). The principal will not only delegate decision-making power, but 
also establish a more comprehensive oversight system. Therefore, authority 
relations of independent agencies are difficult to locate on the traditional 
continuum between tight oversight/less discretion and little oversight/more 
discretion that underlies traditional Principal-Agent analyses (Epstein & 
O'Halloran 1999). 
This article examines the consequences of the re-organization of telecom-
munications in Germany during the 1990s, accompanied by the establishment 
of an (almost) independent regulatory agency within an administrative setting 
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with little experience of independent administrations (Döhler 2002; Müller 
2001). Following the modern theory of social systems (Luhmann 1984, 2000), 
it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by 
increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision-making. 
Drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action (Habermas 
1992), the article argues that functional differentiation supports the transfor-
mation of interaction from interest-based bargaining to deliberative arguing 
both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. 
Two theoretical innovations are put forward, which are relevant for the 
analysis of independent agencies and their consequences beyond the German 
case. First, a regulatory system that includes an independent agency is con-
ceptualized as a non-hierarchical system of divided labor, thereby avoiding the 
narrow focus on the activities, or degree of independence, of the agency and 
taking seriously the fact that the reform process was characterized by an 
increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision-making. 
These regulatory systems consist of different sub-systems, each of which is 
specialized on particular functions that complement each other. Regulation 
emerges from this system as a joint product that is beyond the grip of any 
single actor involved, including the legislator and the agency. In this perspec-
tive, the research focus shifts from discretion and oversight to the distribution 
of functions between the sub-systems involved, their specific rationales of 
decision-making as well as the effects of this division of labour, including the 
modes of integration of partial decisions into a reasonable regulatory output 
(Hancher & Moran 1989). 
Second, attention is drawn to the fact that establishing a system of divided 
labour has repercussions on the interaction within the various sub-systems. 
Effects will depend on the functions allocated to a particular sub-system. The 
most important division in the German regulatory system of the telecommu-
nication sector - and indeed in many other cases - is the separation of two 
core functions: rule-making is assigned to parliament and a closely related 
ministry, while the application of these rules is assigned to the regulatory 
agency. It is argued here that this particular institutional arrangement supports 
the transformation of interaction in both functional areas from interest-based 
bargaining to deliberative arguing (Elster 1998) because it makes it difficult 
for political actors to rely on their power resources, and forces them to reason 
and convince their counterparts (Thatcher & Stone Sweet 2002: 19). 
The article is organized as follows. First, I trace the process of regulatory 
change in Germany with emphasis on the organization of the German state 
supervisory system, rather than market liberalization. Subsequently, I relate 
this process to the sociological theory of social systems and argue that the 
established sub-systems follow distinct decision-making rationales. In the next 
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section, I look more closely at the tasks assigned to the different state actors 
responsible for regulation within the current (new) system and explain the 
separation of legislative/executive and agency functions by the difference 
between short-term and long-term interests. In the following section, I 
examine the effects of functional differentiation on decision-making by both 
legislator/executive and agency. I argue that functional differentiation facili-
tates discursive (deliberative) interaction at both levels. The article concludes 
that a particular form of the division of regulatory functions may constitute a 
source for deliberative decision-making that side-steps parochial interests and 
allows for outcomes that are reasonable in a Habermasian sense. 
Regulatory change and functional differentiation in 
German telecommunications 
The targets of postal reform: Market liberalization and organizational change 
Until 1989, the German telecommunications market was dominated by an 
encompassing state authority that included the Post Office and the Ministry 
of Post and Telecommunication. The authority supplied telecommunication 
and postal services and simultaneously supervised its own activities. While the 
Post Office (Deutsche Bundespost), as the actual provider of services, had in 
German law the status of an actor able to act in its own name and enjoying 
legal standing vis-ä-vis its customers, suppliers and employees, it did not act 
independently from the supervising Ministry. The Minister of Post and 
Telecommunication acted as ministerial supervisor both of the Post Office and 
its chief executive. Based on direct chain of command from the Minister to 
every postal worker, all economic decisions were subject to oversight by the 
federal government (Steinmetz 1956: 33-34). The Post Office also had little 
financial autonomy - while it had its own budget, prices for its services were 
fixed by inter-ministerial coordination (Werle 1990: 83). Moreover, the Min-
istry was almost entirely financed by the Post Office rather than by the general 
government budget like other federal ministries. 
By the end of the 1980s, this longstanding structure was undermined by a 
number of important developments. Technological progress fostered supplier 
interest in the liberalization of some parts of the market (Werle 1990: 
226-243). The European Community developed a strategy of step-by-step 
liberalization of telecommunication markets (Schmidt 1998). There was also 
widespread doubt that a state-organized authority would be able successfully 
to participate in a rapidly growing market (Benz 1997:286-288) because it was 
prevented from entering foreign markets. Finally, the Post Office could not 
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mobilize the necessary capital to finance the modernization, or rather com-
plete reconstruction, of the East German network without access to capital 
markets or financial support from the federal budget (Schmidt 1996: 52-53). 
Both market liberalization and a re-organization of the postal authority were 
needed. 
In the first stage (Postreform I, after 1989), the Post Office was organiza-
tionally separated from the Ministry. Henceforth, it was led by the executives 
of the three economic branches (Deutsche Telekom, henceforth Telekom, as 
well as postal and banking services). It gained some financial autonomy and 
the Ministry came to be financed by the general state budget. Yet the enter-
prise remained integrated in the administrative system of the Ministry because 
a constitutional provision (Grundgesetz, former Article 87.1) required organi-
zation of postal and telecommunication services in the form of a federal 
administration (Schmidt 1996: 46-47). 
This incomplete separation of functions was unfortunate in several ways, 
especially in light of the limited market liberalization of some customer and 
value-added services brought in at the same time (Humphreys 1992). The pre-
dominantly small suppliers entering the newly liberalized sectors of the 
market faced a regulatory agency that was closely related to their main com-
petitor and might have been expected not to favour them (Riehmer 1995:383). 
Conversely, the Post Office, as a part of the ministerial administrative struc-
ture, was, in spite of its new autonomy, not allowed formally to challenge direc-
tives of the Ministry (see parliamentary papers BT-Drs. 11/2854: 39), even 
though conflicts of interest might occur in the partially liberalized market. 
Accordingly, the Ministry was still able to exert considerable influence on eco-
nomic decisions (Grämlich 1997:615). Finally, the Post Office remained a state 
administration that was not able to tap the capital markets and still suffered 
from a comparative disadvantage vis-ä-vis its international competitors 
(Berger 1993: 91-92). 
In the second stage (Postreform II, after 1995), organizational devolution 
proceeded in two areas. Based on a constitutional amendment that required 
two-thirds majorities in both chambers of parliament, economic activities were 
completely separated from the administrative structure of the Ministry and 
assigned to three independent, although still state-owned, stock corporations 
(Schmidt 1996: 55-58). Consequently, the companies gained legal standing 
vis-ä-vis the supervising Ministry. The functions of the Ministry were, in turn, 
reduced to those of regulating private companies under administrative law. 
Oversight was no longer based on internal organizational hierarchy. Within 
the administrative structure of the Ministry, an area of semi-autonomous deci-
sion-making emerged. Separate chambers were established to decide conflicts 
between competing companies, including the former monopoly supplier. The 
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Ministry was not only empowered to issue mandatory directives, it was also 
able to revise decisions adopted by the chambers in their quasi-judicial func-
tion. The limited autonomy of the chambers was justified by the general 
responsibility of the federal administration towards parliament (BT-Drs. 
12/8108:110). Hence, political intervention became more difficult than before, 
but it was by no means impossible. 
In the third stage (Postreform III, after 1998), the telecommunications 
market was entirely liberalized and the organization of the regulatory func-
tion changed once again. The decision chambers originally embedded within 
the administrative structure of the Ministry became the core of the newly 
founded regulatory agency, Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und 
Post (Geppert et al. 1998:529-545). The original Ministry of Post and Telecom-
munication was abolished. Its remaining ministerial functions - for example, 
preparation of new legislation and representation of Germany in international 
organizations as well as in the European Union - were assigned to a new 
department in the Ministry of Economic Affairs. According to the new system, 
decisions of the regulatory agency are still subject to general directives issued 
by the relevant Ministry, but such orders are no longer based on ministerial 
hierarchy, but rather are instruments for conducting relations between inde-
pendent federal administrations and have to be published in the official 
Federal Gazette, the Bundesanzeiger. Moreover, the Ministry is now pre-
vented from making or modifying Regulatory Agency decisions. Hence, while 
the agency is not fully independent from the supervising ministry (Grämlich 
1998), it enjoys at least as much freedom as the Federal Cartel Office (Baake 
& Perschau 1996). 
To conclude, the three-step reform process led not only to an almost com-
plete liberalization of the market for telecommunication services in Germany, 
but also to a profound reorganization of the state activities in the sector. The 
companies of the former Post Office were transformed into privately operat-
ing entities, while state activities were reduced to the regulation of suppliers 
in the market. In this context, a largely independent regulatory agency 
emerged as a new player on the scene. Hence, the reform constituted a process 
of gradual differentiation of functions that was not only limited to the estab-
lished agents but involved the principal as well. 
Theoretical implications of functional differentiation 
In order to grasp the implications of functional differentiation, I will draw 
on the sociological theory of social systems (Luhmann 1984; Munch 1994: 
271-305). In contrast to the usual Principal-Agent perspective on regulation 
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and agencies, this theory is not preoccupied with hierarchy and the ability or 
inability to control, but sheds light on the operation of a functionally differ-
entiated system. In a nutshell, a social system emerges as a new entity from 
communication between actors. It is separated from its environment by its own 
boundaries. Across these boundaries, it extracts bits of information from its 
environment and processes them according to its own internal programme. 
Hence, a social system operates as a selector that reduces complexity by 
'observing' its environment according to its own selection criteria. Organiza-
tions that produce decisions constitute a particularly identifiable type of social 
system (Luhmann 2000). 
As any social system, an organization may increase its selectivity and atten-
tion for the range of relevant information by the formation of sub-systems that 
specialize in the performance of certain tasks (Luhmann 1984: 259-260). A 
sub-system can afford to specialize in some functions relevant for the larger 
social system because other functions are performed by other sub-systems 
focusing on different tasks. Sub-systems operate, so to speak, in a context of 
divided labour. From a functional point of view, no stage of a differentiated 
decision process is per se more important than any other. Functional differ-
entiation of a decision process promises to enhance the performance of the 
larger system (Mayntz 1988) - much as division of labour may increase the 
productivity of a production process. 
An analytical perspective informed by systems theory draws attention to 
three aspects of the process of postal reforms. 
1. Functional differentiation has to do with boundaries between sub-
systems. During the process of postal reform, existing internal bound-
aries between the sub-units of the postal authority as a whole were 
reinforced especially through the organizational independence of the 
three stock companies and the Ministry. Moreover, a new boundary was 
introduced between a supervisory ministerial department and the newly 
established regulatory agency. 
2. By affecting their boundaries, the reform process changed the selection 
criteria of relevant sub-systems. The complete separation of supervisory 
and economic functions allows the newly established stock corporations 
to concentrate on their economic performance and relieves them from 
having to concern themselves with issues such as regional minimum 
supply of infrastructure. Likewise, the supervisory sub-systems are 
relieved from paying attention to the economic well-being of companies 
and the details concerning the supply of services. They may concentrate 
their activities on regulation. Hence, postal reform fostered specializa-
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tion of the sub-systems involved on more clearly distinct selection cri-
teria. Everything else being equal, we may expect better performance 
of the corporations in the market because they operate exclusively 
according to their economic rationale, and we may also expect regula-
tion to be better because it is limited to supervisory functions comple-
mentary to economic decision-making. If the separation of the two 
regulatory sub-systems - a ministerial department and the regulatory 
agency - makes sense, it will contribute to enhancing regulatory per-
formance. This issue deserves closer inspection in the next section. 
Postal reform modified the mechanisms by which the operation of the 
autonomous sub-systems involved is integrated into a meaningful whole. 
Originally, sub-systems of the postal authority as a whole were inte-
grated by hierarchical order and a common interest into the stability of 
the system. For example, the Ministry could order the telecommunica-
tions branch to invest in East Germany even if this were not within its 
own economic rationale, or to cross-subsidize traditional postal services. 
This integration mechanism had de-autonomizing or de-differentiating 
effects because it did not respect the operational autonomy of the 
respective sub-systems. After postal reform, the integration of comple-
mentary functions no longer relies on these mechanisms. Some of the 
new integration mechanisms are quite obvious. For example, the rela-
tionship of the privatized companies to each other and their competi-
tors is now governed by market principles. Likewise, companies will, in 
their own economic interest, pay attention, although not necessarily 
always adhere, to regulatory decisions. Other mechanisms are less 
obvious: How are the activities of the two autonomous regulatory bodies 
(i.e., the Ministry and the agency) integrated? And how do the activi-
ties of the economic actors affect the regulatory activities? These issues 
will be inspected more closely below. 
Separation of the functions of rule-making and rule-application 
Division of labor between regulatory agents 
German telecommunications regulation is characterized by a systematic 
separation between the legislative functions performed by parliament and the 
Ministry, on the one hand, and the application function assigned to the agency, 
on the other. The legislative function deals with enacting legally binding 
and general rules designed to last for a comparatively long period of time 
(although they may be amended at any time, if deemed appropriate) and are 
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applicable to several, possibly many, cases. Parliament as well as, within its 
delegated competence, the Ministry enjoy a considerable margin of discrete 
choice based on their political (parliamentary) accountability. However, their 
activity is limited to providing a set of generally applicable and legally binding 
rules as detailed as may be deemed appropriate. 
The German telecommunications statute (Telekommunikationsgesetz) 
adopted by the two chambers of parliament provides a rather detailed legal 
framework, especially for three areas of expected market failure (Geppert et 
al. 1998). First, in order to create competition in an originally monopolized 
market, competitors and providers of particular services (e.g., operators and 
re-sellers) enjoy a right of access to the Telekom network at reasonable and 
controlled prices. In order to protect small competitors, the former monopoly 
supplier is prohibited from subsidizing highly competitive sectors with rev-
enues from still non-competitive sectors. Second, the statute provides for 
countrywide minimum services at a comparatively high standard and at rea-
sonable prices (so-called 'universal service'). If Telekom no longer provides 
this service, tenders will be invited and the costs split between suppliers of a 
reference region according to their market shares. Third, the statue addresses 
issues of technical and organizational standardization (e.g., distribution and 
compatibility of telephone numbers) as well as questions of the distribution 
of tight resources (e.g., frequencies for mobile phoning). 
Parliament and the Ministry perform the legislative function together. In 
the German system, detailed and technically complicated legislation like this 
is in practice largely prepared and drafted by the responsible ministry. Subse-
quently, the statute is widely discussed in parliament and reflects the opinion 
of a wide majority of parliamentarians. This functional division of labour is 
typical for parliamentary systems in which the head of government is elected 
by a parliamentary majority and ministers are immediately accountable to this 
majority. In fact, the legislature not only entrusted preparatory work to the 
Ministry. The statute also empowers it to enact secondary legislation. So far, 
six ordinances have been created dealing with, inter alia, pricing policies, the 
rights of customers and access to networks (Geppert et al. 1998). 
In contrast to the legislative function, the Regulatory Agency on Telecom-
munication and Post performs an executive function. According to its statute, 
it specializes in case-by-case decision-making in all three areas of regulated 
market failure: regulation of competition, technical and organizational coor-
dination, and assurance of minimum services. It distributes phone numbers 
and auctions mobile phone licenses (UMTS). To support it in its regulatory 
task, the agency enjoys far-reaching rights of investigation, search and seizure, 
as well as sanctioning powers (Grämlich 1997: 636-637). However, its organi-
zational core is made up of its five decision chambers, which operate in 
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a formalized and court-like procedure that is public and based on oral 
deliberation. 
Through its decisions, the agency reacts swiftly to conflicts in the market 
that had not been envisaged by the legislature. It may start investigation on 
its own, for example, if it becomes aware of illegal activity among market par-
ticipants. Moreover, prices charged by Telekom have to be approved ex ante. 
In recent years, the agency has repeatedly refused to approve excessively low 
prices in highly competitive sectors {Handelsblatt, 17 March 1999), or extra-
ordinarily high prices in still monopolized areas (press releases of 20 January 
1999 and 8 February 1999, available online at: www.regtp.de). The decision-
making mechanism may also be triggered by an interested supplier unable to 
settle a conflict with a competitor. In this way, the agency has decided several 
important cases that heavily influence the market for telecommunication ser-
vices. It held, for example, that telephone numbers may be transferred without 
costs from Telekom to other suppliers (press release of 7 April 1998) and 
obliged Telekom to issue bills containing the charges of competitors from 'call-
by-call' phoning (press release of 21 February 2000). 
While the agency has not been granted any explicit margin of discrete 
choice in these areas, its decisions gain relevance because the general (i.e., 
not case-specific) rules of the statute and accompanying ordinances are 
inevitably incomplete (Williamson 1987: 23) and require interpretation. In 
setting precedents and deciding cases, it also creates law, but it does so on the 
basis of the general rules enacted elsewhere. For example, the statute provides 
that Telekom prices for connecting networks must be based on the 'efficient 
provision of services' principle so that the company may only demand that 
part of its actual costs that an efficient company would have had to charge. 
But what do the costs of the efficient provision of services include? While 
Deutsche Telekom had demanded that its 'neutral costs' (including investments 
in East Germany and pensions of its former civil servants) be reimbursed, costs 
were originally fixed at the arithmetic mean between the average of ten com-
parable countries and the three cheapest countries (Geppert et al. 1998: 
308-318). Neither the reference countries, nor the procedure, nor even the 
structure of the tariff system were provided for in law. 
Generally, parliament and the Ministry could have fulfilled all necessary 
regulatory functions on their own. It is the establishment of an additional sub-
system specialized in case-by-case decisions that deprives the Ministry of a 
sub-set of regulatory decision-making. As a consequence, it specializes in aux-
iliary legislative functions. Hence, the regulatory system is characterized by 
the fact that neither of the two sub-systems involved is in control of all com-
petencies needed for successful regulation. 
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An explanation for the separation of rule-making and rule-application 
Is the established division of labour between making the law and applying it 
reasonable? It will be no surprise that parliament delegates case-by-case deci-
sion-making to an administrative body because it could hardly fulfil this 
function properly (Str0m 2000). However, it could have delegated it to the 
Ministry, as it did before 1998. The Ministry had sufficient technical expertise, 
and could easily develop the necessary economic expertise, to regulate the 
market. The agency is hardly more competent than the Ministry would have 
been (in fact, its staff largely comes from the old Ministry). Hence, the puzzle 
is not why there was delegation, but why decision-making power was dele-
gated to a comparatively independent agency operating largely apart from 
ministerial intervention. 
In order to investigate the systematic implications, the advantages and dis-
advantages of the establishment of a largely independent regulatory agency 
within a democratic system, the following hypothetical question must be 
answered: Under what conditions will it be reasonable for a parliamentary 
majority to refrain from adopting implementing decisions under its own close 
control and assign this task to an independent agency? Generally, rational 
actors will only delegate in this way if they anticipate that their intervention 
in subsequent decision-making might counteract their own interests. This will 
not be the case for actors who are aware of their interests, have a consistent 
order of preferences and behave accordingly. However, in some situations, 
actors may have long-term interests that contradict their short-term (i.e., 
situation-specific) preferences so that their order of preferences is inconsis-
tent (Keech 1995:38^0). Consider a political actor (say, state or government) 
faced with a case of hostage-taking. It will be in its long-term interest to 
develop a reputation of generally not negotiating with hostage-takers in order 
to reduce the incentive for future crimes. Nevertheless, there may be good 
reasons in the specific situation to save the lives of hostages (say, a group of 
children) by negotiation, even though the negative long-term implications are 
well-known. The state or government determines its long-term interests at 
point tn, but - for whatever reason - ignores them in a given situation at t, and 
will regret its decision later at point t2 (Elster 1979:67-68). In light of its incon-
sistent order of preferences, it may pursue its short-term preferences only at 
the expense of its long-term interests - and vice versa. It finds itself in a 
dilemma somewhat like the Prisoners' Dilemma, played against 'nature', or 
better: against itself. 
The problem of the inconsistency of preferences over time is relevant for 
the regulation of telecommunication markets. Generally, the problem is 
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well-known in democracies. Policies with a positive effect for public welfare 
may be difficult to implement because elected politicians have an incentive to 
calculate in terms of election periods - with a comparatively short time 
horizon (Shepsle 1991: 250-252) - because they may increase their prospects 
of re-election by 'election gifts', or because the public discounts future gains 
of painful reforms in light of their immediate costs. The problem occurs more 
specifically in the long-term regulation of telecommunication markets. On the 
one hand, support of postal reforms in Germany by a broad majority of the 
members of both chambers of parliament indicates a general interest in trans-
forming the originally state-controlled telecommunications sector into a com-
petitive market, if only to attract private investors in an area characterized by 
huge sunk costs of investment (Majone 1999: 5-6). On the other hand, the 
stream of regulatory decisions to be made over time has major implications 
for the competitive advantage of particular suppliers; it determines the speed 
and scope of structural transformation of Deutsche Telekom from an originally 
state-run authority into a competitive company; it influences the market value 
of Telekom, which is still to a significant degree state-owned; and it affects 
matters of regional interests (e.g., employment and supply with telecommuni-
cation services). Whereas all these issues are important and politically rele-
vant, their intervention into day-to-day decision-making would inevitably 
jeopardize the long-term goal of establishing and maintaining a competitive 
telecommunications market and attracting new investors. Were politically 
accountable actors responsible for adopting these decisions and legitimating 
them vis-ä-vis their voters, they would inevitably find themselves in the 
dilemma of inconsistent preferences (Pollack 2002: 208). 
The dilemma of inconsistent preferences will diminish over time if the time 
horizon of the decision-making system is systematically enlarged by appro-
priate institutional arrangements. Some 'credible commitment' (Shepsle 1991) 
beyond the mere determination of political representatives is needed to take 
long-term interests into account (Elster 1979: 42). To resist the temptation of 
the concrete situation, actors must sacrifice their margin of choice in the con-
crete situation (Elster 1979: 38,2000:65-77) and bind themselves to a suitable 
'mast' like Ulysses did when faced with the Sirens. The 'mast' available in 
modern society is an appropriate institutional restraint. A parliamentary 
majority and a government delegating implementing decisions to an actor that 
is unsusceptible to the temptations of specific situations will credibly bind 
themselves. They seek to avoid exposing themselves to the specific decision 
situation (Cukierman 1994). The almost complete independence of the 
German regulatory agency and of other agencies regulating public utilities 
(Thatcher 1998) provides the institutional prerequisite for this separation 
(Keech 1995:154; Majone 1999: 4-6). 
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Delegation of implementing decisions to an independent agency leads to 
the differentiation of two functions that are indispensable for successful reg-
ulation. The general (i.e., long-term) interests of society in the sector are deter-
mined by a parliamentary majority. In contrast, the application of the general 
rules to numerous specific situations is performed in a way that excludes, as 
far as possible, situation-specific and opportunistic considerations by a suffi-
ciently strict separation of decision-making from the grip of the ruling parlia-
mentary majority. Hence, depending on their time horizon, regulatory 
decisions are adopted by different actors according to different selection 
criteria. 
To conclude, the distinction between long-term interests and situation-
specific (opportunistic) preferences explains the independence of regulatory 
agencies. Legitimate decisions about long-term interests pose other difficul-
ties than the case-by-case application of these decisions to particular situa-
tions. Accordingly, the two tasks require different institutional arrangements 
and are best performed separately from each other. While regulatory decision-
making may appear to be concentrated on the established agency, legislation 
is in fact equally important for successful regulation. 
Consequences of the institutionalized division of regulatory functions 
Discursive rule-making 
Effects of the separation of functions on the rule-making process will have to 
be assessed against the null hypothesis that a majority-supported legislature 
and a fully controlled ministry both prepare and adopt general rules and apply 
these rules to cases or adopt implementing decisions. However detailed 
legislative provisions are, they will always be incomplete (Williamson 1987) 
and will not cover all possible decision situations. This is not a serious problem 
for a majority that controls implementation because general rules are per-
manently interpreted and - implicitly - modified according to its own will. 
Decision-making conditions will change profoundly if the majority loses 
immediate control over implementation decisions. 
If politically legitimated action is limited to the adoption of general rules, 
it will be more difficult to accommodate parochial interests. The making of 
general rules that apply to an unknown number of future cases renders it 
difficult to pursue parochial interests (Brennan & Buchanan 1985: 28-31). 
Frequently, rule-making will take place before relevant political actors become 
aware of their situation-specific (e.g., regional or interest group-related) par-
ticular preferences. Actors must decide about general rules without being 
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aware of their exact parochial interests, especially if the rules are expected to 
be valid for a longer period of time and the rate of change in the regulated 
sector is high. Hence, political actors making general rules tend to operate 
under a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' (Rawls 1971). Even if political actors fully 
anticipate specific decision situations and their preferences in these situations, 
they will be forced to identify an aggregate overall interest. A region like 
Bavaria with high-technology locations and remote border areas can no longer 
separately pursue its interests in a liberalized market and in the provision of 
high-standard minimum infrastructure and in the fate of Telekom as a major 
regional employer. It is now forced to develop a consistent overall preference 
that will almost automatically balance extreme positions. 
If their strategies are ill-determined, even rational utility maximizers will 
be inclined to search for rules promising outcomes that are generally accept-
able. Actors that are not aware of their parochial interests cannot pursue them 
by classical bargaining (Elster 1989). They are faced with the common problem 
of identifying rules that ensure acceptable implementation decisions inde-
pendently of their (yet unknown) situation-specific preferences (Tsebelis 1990: 
115-118). This task will be facilitated by discursive interaction based on the 
exchange of reasonable arguments (Vanberg & Buchanan 1989; Elster 1998). 
Political negotiations about sufficiently general rules tend thus to approach 
a Habermasian discourse (Habermas 1992) in which reasons rather than 
power and sanctions dominate interaction and influence collective decisions 
(Gehring 2003). 
The separation of regulatory functions provides incentives for rational 
utility maximizers to change to discursive interaction and facilitates a process 
of rule-making that does not, in the first place, rely on the balancing of clear-
cut preferences. Parochial interests, whether well-founded or not, will hardly 
be completely absent in practice, and political actors may be inclined to 
bargain even if they are quite unaware of their 'real' future preferences. The 
argument here is that functional differentiation helps mobilize an additional 
mechanism to increase regulatory performance based on the common search 
for acceptable solutions independent of power and interests. 
Discursive decision-making also at the application level? 
Decisions at the rule-application level raise the problem of accountability 
beyond close control. Effective delegation of decision-making power always 
implies a thread of abuse. It raises the question of how to provide appropri-
ate incentives to the agency in order to prevent abuse (Kiewiet & McCubbins 
1991; Moe 1990). If the institutionalized separation of regulatory functions is 
a response to the problem of inconsistent preferences, it must be ensured that 
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the agency operates according to the long-term interests of the legislature. 
However, close oversight by the legislature would almost automatically jeop-
ardize its intention of binding itself to its long-term interests and of avoiding 
interfering in situation-specific decision-making. While 'agency-shirking' is not 
a negligible problem, the agency requires a high degree of autonomy to dis-
charge its functions properly (Majone 2001). Hence, suitable incentives must 
be sought elsewhere. They will immediately depend on the precise institutional 
arrangements as well as the underlying conditions of regulation. 
Formally, the German regulatory agency is merely semi-independent at 
best. The Ministry may not decide cases in the place of the agency, and it may 
not change agency decisions after the fact (Geppert at al. 1998:534). However, 
it is empowered to issue 'general' (i.e., not case-specific) directives that are 
published in the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) and attract considerable 
public attention. It also appoints the head of the agency as well as the members 
of the decision chambers, and may replace them at any time. These arrange-
ment are largely a consequence of the peculiarities of German constitutional 
law (Döhler 2002:104-105). They are intended to establish at least the fiction 
(Grämlich 1998: 464) of some remote ministerial responsibility. 
Despite formal ministerial powers, the regulatory agency poses problems 
of legitimacy and control typical for independent agencies. While the occa-
sional use of remaining oversight powers cannot be excluded, their employ-
ment in response to undesired decisions would cause comparatively high 
political costs because of their visibility (Majone 1999: 15). Moreover, the 
established institutional arrangement would necessarily be undermined. 
Therefore, ministerial powers do not provide a useful mechanism for over-
seeing 'normal' day-to-day decision-making of the agency, nor can they legit-
imize these decisions. They constitute at best an emergency break, usable only 
in extreme situations. It is worth noting that the regulatory agency enjoys a 
degree of formal independence beyond that of the Federal Cartel Office (Bun-
deskartellamt), which developed an international reputation for independent 
decision-making (Baake & Perschau 1996). 
Even under the assumption of a complete de facto separation of the func-
tions of rule-making and rule-application, independence is not necessarily an 
indicator of arbitrariness in decision-making and an absence of control and 
legitimacy. Not even a fully 'independent' agency is independent from parlia-
ment enacting relevant statutes, or from the judiciary appraising its decisions 
(Shapiro 1997: 278). Two interconnected social mechanisms may be identified 
that provide appropriate incentives even to independent agencies. One super-
visory mechanism operates by legislative activity. At first glance, it may seem 
that legislature and ministry are out of the game once they have established 
the system. However, the legislature exerts continuously significant influence 
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on day-to-day decision-making by providing substantial and procedural rules 
before a particular application decision is adopted (Huber et al. 2001; Bawn 
1997; Epstein & O'Halloran 1994). It is potentially the most definitive set of 
instructions that can be given to an agency with respect to the actions it must 
take during policy implementation. In the case of the German agency, these 
instructions include numerous substantive and procedural rules guiding the 
operation of the supervisory apparatus. 
In order to fulfil its programming function, legislation must really reflect 
the long-term interests of the principal and may have to be adapted to new 
circumstances. Application decisions can hardly be more reasonable than the 
rules that are applied. Outdated legal instructions that no longer reflect the 
long-term interests of the legislature, as well as ill-designed rules that create 
difficulties at the implementation level, will not provide the appropriate incen-
tives. Successful integration of the rule-making and rule-application functions 
is part of the job of the legislature when providing general rules that allow 
reasonable application decisions. Accordingly, it is among parliamentary and 
ministerial functions to observe the operation of the regulatory system care-
fully - either systematically in the form of police patrols or more incidentally 
by becoming sensitive to conflicts and 'fire alarm' signals (McCubbins & 
Schwartz 1987). If necessary, statutes must be revised in order to re-
programme secondary decision-making by the agency and relevant courts. In 
a functionally divided regulatory system, the appropriate legislative and min-
isterial response to conflicts is the making of new general rules, not interven-
tion into case-by case decision-making. 
A second mechanism is based on the supervisory function of courts 
(Shapiro 1988). Courts are specialized in appraising concrete action in the light 
of general rules. Because of their specific mode of operation and their own 
independence, they are also largely precluded from judging on the basis of 
situation-specific preferences and, implicitly, programmed to implement the 
legislature's long-term interests as reflected in the law. If an agency enjoys 
almost no explicit margin of discrete choice, as is the case for the German reg-
ulatory agency, a court will also examine whether the decision constitutes a 
reasonable interpretation and application of relevant general provisions. It 
will inquire into how the agency reached its decision. Accordingly, the agency 
may expect to be asked to provide reasons for the appropriateness of its deci-
sion in light of possible alternatives. 
Anticipation of subsequent court appraisal provides a strong incentive for 
the agency to reach decisions that could have been reached in a discourse 
characterized by the absence of power and parochial interests. Habermas 
(1992:138, my translation) argues that 'norms of behaviour that are valid are 
precisely those which could be agreed upon by all those possibly affected, if 
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they were participants in rational discourses'. In light of the possibility of court 
appraisal, an agency will strive for decisions that are supported by convincing 
reasons and therefore increase the probability of approval by responsible 
courts, rather than pursue arbitrary goals. The 'giving-reasons requirement' 
(Shapiro 1992) creates, in turn, an interest on the part of the agency in becom-
ing aware as early as possible of alternatives, and the opinions of relevant 
actors and accompanying reasons. The agency will, in its own interest, orga-
nize hearings and consultations with these private parties and sincerely take 
the information thus gathered into account when deciding a pending conflict 
(Thatcher 1998:131). Moreover, reasonable arguments must be processed in 
ways that ensure convincing results. Accordingly, an agency will be interested 
in engaging in a discursive appraisal of arguments on the proper application 
of mandatory rules to a particular decision situation. This does not require 
consensus among all interested parties. The agency will merely create a triadic 
interaction situation typical of courts in which the adversarial parties produce 
arguments that are subsequently appraised and weighed against each other by 
a third party. 
A prerequisite for the proper operation of this method of making an 
agency accountable to the public is that court supervision is really anticipated. 
There must be a certain minimum probability that proceedings are in fact insti-
gated. The mechanism will operate particularly well if many actors whose 
interests are possibly affected have legal standing. In some cases, this condi-
tion is hardly fulfilled. For example, it is virtually impossible to instigate court 
proceedings against decisions of independent central banks. In contrast, deci-
sions of the regulatory agency immediately affect particular third parties 
(usually firms) that have legal standing. Its decisions may always be, and 
frequently are, subject to court decision-making (Müller 2001: 59-60). 
Integration of the rule-making and the rule-application functions is not 
only ensured from 'above' (i.e., by the principal), but also from 'below'. In 
Principal-Agent language, one might say that the legislature not only delegates 
decision-making but also oversight functions (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991: 
33-34). In the first place, oversight is delegated to existing courts that become 
an additional sub-system in the chain of regulatory decision-making 
specialized to the appraisal of regulatory decisions in light of valid rules. In 
the second place, it is delegated to numerous self-interested sub-state and 
non-state actors (here predominantly the competitors in the telecommunica-
tion market) that trigger the decision-making process. In this institutional 
arrangement, high-quality regulatory decisions are the result of interaction 
between three types of sub-system, all of which enjoy considerable autonomy 
and none of which must be assumed to voluntarily adopt the perspective of 
the legislature. 
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To conclude, the institutionalized separation of regulatory functions facil-
itates discursive decision-making at the agency level, too. The appropriate 
separation of regulatory functions generates an agency interest in producing 
reasonable decisions. Ideally, its discrete choice will be limited to the selection 
of one out of a number of equally reasonable options, if there are any alter-
natives. In practice, supervision will never be complete and distortions will 
occur. Therefore, it is merely claimed that the separation of functions 
supports deliberative decision-making and promises more reasonable deci-
sions than reliance on the power of majorities or bargaining processes. 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the dominant Principal-Agent approach, the approach devel-
oped in this article is designed to address both independence and oversight. 
Establishing an independent agency automatically separates regulatory func-
tions and limits the activities of a legislature, or those of a closely controlled 
ministry, to some of the functions originally performed. In this type of insti-
tutionalized division of labour, complementary functions are fulfilled by spe-
cialized sub-systems operating according to their own rules. Tight oversight of 
its activities by a principal would partially or entirely deprive an agency of the 
autonomy required to perform its functions and undermine the regulatory 
system. Yet, independence from parliamentary or ministerial intervention and 
operational autonomy of an agency does not necessarily mean high degrees 
of freedom and an almost unlimited ability to adopt arbitrary decisions. 
The German system for the regulation of the telecommunications market 
exemplifies the relevance of functional differentiation. While telecommunica-
tions services in Germany were originally supplied by an encompassing postal 
authority, the system is today characterized by interaction of a number of 
autonomous units, each of which operates according to its own rationale. 
Postal reforms not only separated the economic rationale of stock corpora-
tions from the political rationale of state supervision, they also separated the 
making of general rules, retained by the legislature and a ministry, from the 
application of these rules through case-by-case decision-making, assigned to a 
comparatively independent regulatory agency. This separation of regulatory 
functions is explained by the probable inconsistency of long-term interests and 
short-term preferences. Apparently, the German legislature desired to bind 
itself by an appropriate institutional arrangement. 
On closer inspection, however, establishing an independent agency not 
only constituted an appropriate institutional response to the problem of incon-
sistent preferences, it also promised to facilitate discursive (deliberative) inter-
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action over power-based decision-making at both the legislative and the 
agency levels. Decisions at the former level tend to be taken under a Rawl-
sian 'veil of ignorance' that forces even rational utility maximizers to deliber-
ate rather than bargain because actors decide exclusively about general rules 
applicable to an unknown number of future cases. Decisions at the latter level 
are influenced by the fact that the agency, while not enjoying any explicit 
margin of discrete choice, generates an interest in producing reasonable deci-
sions because it must anticipate their subsequent appraisal by the judiciary. 
The appropriate separation of the two functions of rule-making and rule-appli-
cation triggers a social mechanism that will, ideally, bring about Habermasian 
communicative action even in a setting characterized by vested interests. 
These benign consequences of the institutionalized separation of functions 
are not unique to the regulation of telecommunications in Germany. They may 
be far more widespread than assumed from a traditional Principal-Agent 
perspective. The general causal mechanism may be expected to operate if the 
following three conditions are fulfilled. First, functions must be effectively sep-
arated. What matters is actual rather than formal autonomy. This condition 
will not only be fulfilled by formally independent agencies like those regulat-
ing public utilities in an increasing number of states, but it may also be ful-
filled by large parts of non-ministerial public administrations in European 
countries that traditionally enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Second, discur-
sive interaction at the political (rule-making) level will depend on the inabil-
ity of actors to identify and pursue their case-specific interests. Whether this 
is the case will depend not least on the subject matter to be regulated. This 
condition will not be fulfilled if a majority outvotes a minority on substance. 
Third, decisions adopted at the lower (application) level will have to be made 
in light of meaningful legislative instructions of a more general type. Func-
tions do not necessary have to be divided exactly between rule-making and 
rule-application. Some agencies have the power to make rules. What matters 
is that decision-makers can be, and effectively are, made accountable for their 
decisions. 
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